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Abstract
Since the 2016 US Presidential election, social media abuse
has been eliciting massive concern in the academic commu-
nity and beyond. Preventing and limiting the malicious activ-
ity of users, such as trolls and bots, in their manipulation cam-
paigns is of paramount importance for the integrity of democ-
racy, public health, and more. However, the automated detec-
tion of troll accounts is an open challenge. In this work, we
propose an approach based on Inverse Reinforcement Learn-
ing (IRL) to capture troll behavior and identify troll accounts.
We employ IRL to infer a set of online incentives that may
steer user behavior, which in turn highlights behavioral dif-
ferences between troll and non-troll accounts, enabling their
accurate classification. As a study case, we consider the troll
accounts identified by the US Congress during the investiga-
tion of Russian meddling in the 2016 US Presidential elec-
tion. We report promising results: the IRL-based approach is
able to accurately detect troll accounts (AUC=89.1%). The
differences in the predictive features between the two classes
of accounts enables a principled understanding of the distinc-
tive behaviors reflecting the incentives trolls and non-trolls
respond to.
Introduction
During the last few years, social media have been facing a
huge wave of nefarious activity on their platforms. For in-
stance, the massive diffusion of digital misinformation and
the increasing presence of malicious accounts have been
identified as major threats for a healthy online discussion,
other than as primary factors contributing to the manipula-
tion of public opinion on social media (Ferrara 2015). Exam-
ples of social media manipulation can be found in a variety
of contexts, ranging from politics to public health (Allem et
al. 2017; Chen, Lerman, and Ferrara 2020), e.g., diffusion
of false news, guerrilla advertising, anti-vaccination move-
ments, and stock market manipulation. In particular, the risk
of mass manipulation of public opinion is creating enormous
concerns in the political sphere, where social media abuse
has been shown to harm the democracy of online discussions
and may affect the sovereignty of the election (Vosoughi,
Roy, and Aral 2018; Stella, Ferrara, and De Domenico 2018;
Copyright c© 2020, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
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Metaxas and Mustafaraj 2012; Del Vicario et al. 2017;
Howard, Kollanyi, and Woolley 2016).
One of the most striking cases, in the political context, re-
gards the Russian interference in the online discussion dur-
ing the 2016 US Presidential election. Russia has been ac-
cused of using bots (i.e., software controlled accounts) and
trolls (i.e., human operators tied with information opera-
tion agencies) to spread propaganda and politically biased
information. In this regards, the US Congress disclosed a
list of 2,752 (now-deactivated) Twitter accounts that have
been identified as tied to the Russia’s “Internet Research
Agency” (IRA). Russia’s troll farm constitutes the first re-
vealed case of human operators assembled to carry a de-
ceptive online interference campaign. The activity of such
accounts has been extensively documented by the research
community, highlighting their attempts at sowing division
along divergent narrative frames (Badawy et al. 2019; Ger-
ber and Zavisca 2016; Badawy, Lerman, and Ferrara 2019;
Dutt, Deb, and Ferrara 2018; Badawy, Ferrara, and Ler-
man 2018; Zannettou et al. 2019a; Broniatowski et al. 2018;
Stewart, Arif, and Starbird 2018; Kim et al. 2019).
Most recently, Twitter identified and suspended malicious
accounts originating from Russia, Iran, Bangladesh, and
Venezuela, suggesting the presence of efforts to manipulate
online discourse across countries (Gadde and Roth 2018).
Although the attempt from social media providers to purge
their platform, malicious accounts persist (Im et al. 2019;
Luceri et al. 2019a), conducting manipulation campaigns
over diverse global political events (Ferrara 2017) and mul-
tiple consecutive elections (Luceri et al. 2019b). Prevent-
ing and limiting the activity of such operators is of fun-
damental importance for the integrity of voting events.
While researchers have brought to the table different ap-
proaches for identifying bot accounts (Davis et al. 2016;
Varol et al. 2017a; Yang et al. 2019; Chavoshi, Hamooni, and
Mueen 2016; Subrahmanian et al. 2016; Chen and Subrama-
nian 2018; Kudugunta and Ferrara 2018), the detection of
trolls remains an open challenge. Zannettou et al. (Zannet-
tou et al. 2019b) found that the behavior of state-sponsored
trolls varies over time: automatically unveiling their activ-
ity is not straightforward and researchers have not yet estab-
lished a principled solution to the detection of troll accounts.
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Contributions of this work
In this paper, we propose an approach for identifying troll
accounts based on Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL).
Our solution only relies on the flow of users’ activity on so-
cial media. In particular, we aim to consider whether and
how users’ online activity is affected by the interaction with
peers and, more specifically, by the feedback they receive
from other users in the social network, e.g., a user might be
more motivated to share new content if she receives posi-
tive feedback from others. The rationale is to unveil the in-
centives driving trolls’ activity and utilize such cues for dis-
tinguishing them from non-troll accounts (henceforth, sim-
ply referred to as users). The objective of inferring intent
and motivation from observed behavior has been extensively
studied under the framework of IRL. Specifically, IRL has
the main goal of finding the rewards behind an agent’s ob-
served behavior (Piot, Geist, and Pietquin 2016). In our sce-
nario, we employ IRL to infer the rewards that could have
led trolls and users to perform their online activity. We then
consider to exploit the estimated rewards as features of a
supervised learning algorithm aimed at classifying such ac-
counts. To evaluate the proposed approach, we consider the
Twitter accounts identified by the US Congress as tied to the
IRA’s troll farm. Results corroborate our intuition and high-
light peculiar characteristics steering trolls’ online behavior.
Our work conveys the following three contributions:
• We show that an established user behavioral model (Wang
et al. 2016) based on users’ clickstream (i.e., sequence of
online actions) is not suitable for discerning trolls’ activ-
ity. According to the outcome of the clickstream cluster-
ing (Wang et al. 2016), trolls seem to behave similarly to
other users, hence appear indistinguishable from them.
• We present a novel approach for detecting the activity of
trolls on social media. To the best of our knowledge, the
presented approach is the first attempt to use IRL for clas-
sification purposes and, in particular, to identify malicious
accounts. The IRL-based classification approach is able to
accurately detect Russian troll accounts with an AUC of
89.1% based only on the flow of their online activities.
• The rewards estimated with IRL show significant behav-
ioral differences between trolls and users, suggesting that
these two classes of accounts respond to different sets of
incentives. In particular, Russian trolls differ in their be-
havior when engaged by other users or when their content
is re-shared. They perform their activity regardless of the
feedback they get from non-trolls and merely focus on the
spread of the content they generate.
Data
To attain a set of trolls that serves as ground truth, we rely on
the list of 2,752 Twitter accounts identified as Russian trolls
by the US Congress and publicly released1 during the in-
vestigation of Russian interference in the 2016 Presidential
election. To recover trolls’ tweets, we leverage the dataset
1Recode’s Twitter’s list of 2,752 Russian trolls. See:
https://www.recode.net/2017/11/2/16598312/russia-twitter-
trump-twitter-deactivated-handle-list
collected by the research community (Addawood et al. 2019;
Badawy et al. 2019). The authors utilized Crimson Hexagon,
a platform that provides paid datastream access. This al-
lowed the authors to obtain tweets generated by trolls and
subsequently deleted after their suspension from Twitter
(Addawood et al. 2019; Badawy et al. 2019). The dataset
presents 1,148 Russian trolls who posted over 1.2M tweets.
Our dataset also includes non-troll users’ tweets, which
have been collected by the researchers (Addawood et al.
2019; Badawy et al. 2019) by utilizing a set of keywords
(employed also in (Bessi and Ferrara 2016)) related to the
2016 US Presidential election event. Also, to capture users’
baseline behavior (not strictly related to the political con-
text), the authors gathered tweets from the same users that
do not include the political-based keywords. This collection
yielded 12,361,285 tweets produced by 1,166,760 users.
We pre-processed this dataset to filter out accounts en-
gaged with just a few tweets. In particular, we consider only
users and trolls that shared at least k = 10 posts and were
involved in at least k = 10 other accounts’ posts (retweet, re-
ply, or mention). This allowed us to build, for each account,
a time-ordered sequence of tweets (of at least 20 elements)
in which the account is involved both actively and passively.
Such filtering resulted in 342 trolls and 1,981 users. In the
next sections, we describe how we aim to analyze the se-
quence of users’ online activity to characterize their behav-
ior and recognize malicious accounts.
User Behavior Analysis
The focus of this paper is to unveil distinctive behaviors and
incentives of trolls with respect to other users to enable their
detection. Notice that our goal is to identify malicious ac-
counts controlled by humans and that, thus, do not rely on
automation. Several studies try to provide an understand-
ing of human behavior through their online activity (Ler-
man and Hogg 2010; Lerman et al. 2012; Wang et al. 2016;
Das and Lavoie 2014). In (Wang et al. 2016), the analy-
sis of users’ clickstream on social media is used to iden-
tify common behaviors. The authors propose an unsuper-
vised method to categorize behavioral patterns and cluster
users accordingly. More specifically, clickstream clustering
(Wang et al. 2016) identifies clusters of similar users by
partitioning a similarity graph, whose nodes represent users
and edges among them are weighted to capture users’ activ-
ity similarity. The authors use a hierarchical clustering ap-
proach and an iterative feature pruning technique to detect
behavioral patterns and build a hierarchy of clusters, where
higher-level (resp. lower-level) clusters encode more general
(resp. specific) behavioral patterns. This approach has been
proven to outperform existing clustering methods (e.g., K-
means) in user behavior analysis. It has been shown that such
model can help service providers to identify unexpected be-
havior such as malicious accounts and hostile chatters.
Therefore, with the objective of characterizing and de-
tecting malicious trolls’ activity, we attempt to model the
online behavior of social media accounts by leveraging the
clickstream clustering approach. The input of the clustering
approach is represented by the sequence of online actions
performed by every account. We determine these activities
according to the sharing options available on Twitter, i.e.,
tweet, retweet, reply, and mention. The output of this ap-
proach is a tree hierarchy of behavioral clusters populated
by the accounts under investigation.
In our scenario, the clickstream clustering results in 5 dis-
jointed clusters, which do not present any hierarchical pat-
tern among them, suggesting that such groups are strongly
distinguished. The clickstream clustering approach also out-
puts the Action Patterns, which characterize the behavior of
the accounts in every cluster. The Action Patterns provide a
statistical description of how accounts within a given cluster
are different from accounts outside of the cluster based on
their activities. Basically, the Action Patterns explain how
clusters have formed and which user behavior every clus-
ter encompasses. Therefore, by inspecting the output of the
clustering approach, we aim to understand whether and how
trolls can be distinguished from users. The 5 clusters (named
C1, C2, C3, C4, and C5) differ from each other as follows:
C1: composed of 504 accounts (17.0% trolls). Accounts in
this cluster perform reply and retweet less frequently than
the accounts outside the cluster.
C2: composed of 162 accounts (15.4% trolls). Accounts in
this cluster tweet more frequently and retweet less fre-
quently than the accounts outside the cluster.
C3: composed of 261 accounts (13.8% trolls). Accounts in
this cluster perform mention more frequently than the ac-
counts outside the cluster.
C4: composed of 1034 accounts (17.1% trolls). Accounts in
this cluster retweet more frequently than the accounts out-
side the cluster.
C5: composed of 362 accounts (5% trolls). Accounts in this
cluster perform reply more frequently than the accounts
outside the cluster.
From the above clustering outcome, it appears that trolls
behave similarly to other users. In fact, troll accounts are
embedded in every of the above clusters with a comparable
percentage (except from C5), which makes them indistin-
guishable from users.
This finding motivates us to explore other approaches for
unveiling such malicious accounts. Although online activ-
ities represent users’ behavior in the social network, their
analysis takes only into account individual behavior. In such
a way, we do not consider whether and how users are influ-
enced by the interaction with others (Anagnostopoulos, Ku-
mar, and Mahdian 2008; Luceri, Braun, and Giordano 2019;
Luceri et al. 2017) and, more specifically, by the feed-
back they receive from their peer (Crandall et al. 2008;
Das and Lavoie 2014). The effects of social feedback on on-
line activities have been studied in (Das and Lavoie 2014),
where the authors argue how the potential endorsement from
other users may trigger or retrain online activities. For exam-
ple, a user might be more motivated to share new contents if
she receives positive feedback. In a similar way, we aim to
understand the driving forces behind the online activities of
trolls and users with the purpose of understanding whether
behavioral differences can arise between these two classes
of accounts. The objective of inferring intent and motivation
Figure 1: RL schema (Sutton and Barto 2018)
form observed behavior has been extensively studied under
the framework of IRL (Reddy, Dragan, and Levine 2018).
Therefore, in this study we rely on the IRL paradigm, which
we detail in the next Section.
Methodology
In this Section, we first provide an overview of the IRL
paradigm. We then discuss how we leverage IRL to char-
acterize the online activity of social media accounts. We fi-
nally present the IRL formulation to assess users’ and trolls’
incentives (i.e., rewards), which are subsequently used for
the detection purpose.
Background
In this subsection, we present the background needed to
comprehend the proposed IRL-based approach to detect
trolls. IRL is a machine learning framework that aims at
solving the inverse problem of Reinforcement Learning
(RL). Therefore, we first formalize the RL paradigm, which
will guide the subsequent presentation of IRL.
Reinforcement Learning RL is defined as the problem
faced by an agent that learns how to behave through trial-
and-error interactions with an uncertain environment (Kael-
bling, Littman, and Moore 1996). The objective of the agent
is to achieve a goal by performing a sequence of actions in
the environment. The agent learns the actions to take accord-
ing to some rewards or penalties.
The most used and straightforward way to formulate a RL
problem is to frame the environment as a finite Markov De-
cision Process (MDP), which includes:
• A finite set of states S, which represents the situation in
which the agent finds itself in the environment;
• A finite set of actions A that the agent can perform in the
environment;
• Transition probabilities T between states, which represent
the probability to move from one state to another when
performing a certain action;
• A finite set of scalar rewards R associated with each tran-
sition;
• A discount factor γ, which determines the importance be-
tween short-term and long-term rewards.
The general framework of a RL problem is displayed in
Fig. 1. The agent (e.g., a robot) has to learn how to achieve
a goal (e.g., the end point of a maze) from the interac-
tion with the environment (e.g., a maze with rewards and
penalties). The agent and the environment interact at each
step t of a sequence of discrete time steps (t = 0, 1, 2, . . .)
(Sutton and Barto 2018). The interaction flow follows the
schema displayed in Fig. 1: At each step t, the agent se-
lect an action At ∈ A based on its current state St ∈ S.
The environment responds to such action and presents to
the agent a new state St+1 ∈ S and a reward Rt+1 ∈ R
associated with the transition (St, At). As time steps goes
by, a sequence, called trajectory ζ, as the following arises:
ζ = {(S0, A0), (S1, A1), (S2, A2), . . .}.
Inverse Reinforcement Learning While in RL the agent
is provided with a reward function, which is used to achieve
a given goal, the rationale of IRL is to find the rewards that
explains the observed behavior of the agent. This objective
has two main motivations (Ng, Russell, and others 2000).
The first reason is for imitation purpose (i.e., to replicate
the agent’s behavior), when a reward function is not explic-
itly determined (Ramachandran and Amir 2007). The sec-
ond reason is to support behavioral studies, where computa-
tional models are needed for understanding human and an-
imal behavior (Watkins 1989; Touretzky and Saksida 1997;
Das and Lavoie 2014).
Formalizing, the objective of IRL is to estimate a re-
ward function that could have led to agent’s actions. More
specifically, and relying on the MDP framework described
above, the observed behavior of the agent is expressed as
the history of its trajectory ζ. The goal is to uncover the
hidden reward function that maps each state-action pair
(s, a) to a real value rs,a ∈ R. Therefore, IRL aims to
find a function g such that: g(S,A) = R. In many appli-
cations, however, the size of the state space does not al-
low to compute a reward function for every state-action
pair. Therefore, current IRL techniques leverage features
that approximate the state-action space to capture the struc-
ture of the reward function (Ng, Russell, and others 2000;
Abbeel and Ng 2004; Ratliff, Bagnell, and Zinkevich 2006;
Levine, Popovic, and Koltun 2010).
The Maximum Entropy IRL (Ziebart et al. 2008) repre-
sents the most popular solution to solve IRL problems. This
approach maps a set of features f to the reward R as a
weighted linear combination of the feature values:
g(f) = g(f, θ) = θTf = R. (1)
Most recent approaches propose non-linear models to rep-
resent the reward structure (Wulfmeier, Ondruska, and Pos-
ner 2015; Choi and Kim 2013; Levine, Popovic, and Koltun
2011). In particular, Wulfmeier et al. (Wulfmeier, Ondruska,
and Posner 2015) introduce the usage of Convolutional Neu-
ral Networks in the context of IRL in an approacch called
Maximum Entropy Deep IRL. This approach has showed
comparable performance with respect to Maximum Entropy
IRL and is considered particularly suited for life-long learn-
ing scenarios (Wulfmeier, Ondruska, and Posner 2015).
Twitter MDP
We here propose to model the social media Twitter with a
MDP. More specifically, we represent Twitter as an environ-
ment constituted of multiple agents (i.e., Twitter accounts)
that interact with each other to achieve a certain goal (e.g., to
spread content, increase their popularity, or influence other
people). The interaction between every agent and the envi-
ronment abides by the RL schema described in Section Re-
inforcement Learning. The agent performs a certain action
(e.g., share a content) and receive a feedback from the en-
vironment (e.g., the content is re-shared by other accounts).
In such environment, we consider that the following four ac-
tions can be performed by the agents:
• Generate original content. We refer to this action as active
tweet (tw).
• Re-share content generated by others. We refer to this ac-
tion as active retweet (rt).
• Interact with other users by means of reply or mention.
We refer to this action as active reply (rp).
• Keep silent. We refer to this action as active nothing (nt).
The Twitter environment, in turn, responds to such actions
and presents to the agent a new state. We represent the set of
states with the three following feedback the environment can
provide to the agent:
• Re-share agent’s tweet. We refer to this state as passive
retweet (RT).
• Interact with the agent by means of reply or mention. We
refer to this state as passive reply (RP).
• Do not engage with the agent. We refer to this state as
passive nothing (NT).
We leverage the history of the accounts on Twitter to ana-
lyze their interaction with the environment. To this aim, we
sort in chronological order every online activity in which the
account is involved, either actively (actions) and passively
(states). Therefore, at each step (i.e., an element of the or-
dered sequence of the account’s online activities) the agent
can be in one of the above mentioned states and perform
only one action. We consider the agent to execute action nt
(active nothing) if it does not react to the environment feed-
back, e.g., it does not perform tw, rt, and rp. Similarly, we
represent with NT the case in which the environment does
not react to agent’s action.
Users and Trolls IRL
As we mentioned in Section Inverse Reinforcement Learn-
ing, the state-action space is usually represented by a set
of features f . Similarly to (Rhinehart and Kitani 2018), we
build f by concatenating variables related to the set of states
and actions. Specifically, we define f as the possible com-
binations of the following variables: (RT, RP, tw, rt, rp),
where the first two features represent the state space, while
the last three features indicate the action space. Each feature
is a binary variable, which assumes value 1 based on the
state in which the agent is and the action it performs (e.g., if
the agent is in the state RT the first feature assumes value 1,
while the second feature equals to 0). The state NT is repre-
sented by setting the first two features to zero, while the last
three features equal to zero indicates the action nt. As an
example, the tuple (0, 0, 0, 0, 1) indicates that the agent per-
formed an active reply (rp) while it was in state NT . Given
that at each step the agent can be in only one state and per-
forms only one action there exists 12 possible combinations
of state-action pairs. As an example, the pair (RT,tw) de-
scribes the scenario where the environment returns a retweet
and the agent generates a new tweet. Therefore, f is a 5×12
matrix, where 5 is the number of features and 12 is the num-
ber of state-action pair possible combinations. In turn, the
reward function is a 1× 12 vector, where each element rep-
resents the scalar reward of a certain state-action pair.
Based on the ordered list of states and actions, we build
for each account a trajectory ζ composed of the feature rep-
resentation of state-action pairs, as discussed above. Such
trajectory represents the observed behavior of the agent. We
then utilize IRL approaches to estimate the reward function
that drove agent’s behavior. The rationale is to investigate
whether users and trolls share the same rewards or, oppo-
sitely, are guided by different incentives. To this end, we em-
ploy two IRL approaches: Maximum Entropy IRL (Ziebart
et al. 2008) and its non linear variation, i.e., Maximum En-
tropy Deep IRL (Wulfmeier, Ondruska, and Posner 2015).
We deploy such IRL approaches by leveraging (Alger 2016).
It should be noticed that every account is modeled indepen-
dently from the others. This means that a unique IRL model
has been developed for each account. Each model takes as
inputs the feature matrix f , the trajectory ζ, and the transi-
tion probabilities T . As discussed in Section Reinforcement
Learning, the latter represents the probability of transition
from state s ∈ S to state s′ ∈ S after performing action
a ∈ A. We compute T by observing the occurrences of
(s, a, s′) triplets in the account’s trajectory. Both the IRL
approaches use these inputs to compute the reward function
R, which determines the scalar reward for each state-action
pair. We do not present in details the methodology behind
the employed IRL solutions as it is out of the scope of this
paper. The interested reader can refer to (Ziebart et al. 2008;
Wulfmeier, Ondruska, and Posner 2015). In the next subsec-
tion, we explain how we employ the estimated rewards for
detecting trolls activity.
Trolls Detection
For every account, IRL approaches output 12 scalar values
related to the state-action combination described above. As
an example, Fig. 2 depicts the estimated rewards related to
the online activity of a generic user. Each value represents
the reward that could have led the account to perform a given
action in a certain state. A high reward in the generic state-
action pair (s, a) indicates that the user is very motivated
to perform action a in state s. The opposite holds for low
reward values.
Our approach aims to understand whether some differ-
ences can be noticed in the motivation and incentives be-
tween trolls and users. We hypothesize that reward val-
ues might highlight distinctive behavioral characteristics be-
tween troll and user accounts. Therefore, we propose to uti-
lize the 12 reward values to discriminate these two classes of
accounts. More specifically, we utilize the estimated rewards
as features of a supervised learning algorithm aimed at de-
tecting troll accounts. We frame this problem as a classifica-
tion task, where the two classes are troll (positive class) and
Figure 2: Example of estimated rewards: the x-axis displays
the set of actions, the y-axis the set of states, and each value
represents the estimated reward for the state-action pair.
user (negative class). We test several off-the-shelf machine
learning algorithms to perform such classification, whose re-
sults are discussed in the next Section.
Results
In this Section, we first discuss the results of the IRL-based
classification approach for detecting troll accounts on social
media. Then, we analyze the incentives that users and trolls
respond to and we highlight the behavioral differences be-
tween these two classes of accounts.
Account Classification
The dataset under investigation presents imbalanced classes,
with the negative class (more than) 5 times larger than the
positive one (1,981 vs. 342 accounts). To solve the data
imbalanced issue, we employ the undersampling technique
(Liu, Wu, and Zhou 2008; Drummond and Holte 2003),
which uses only a random set of the larger class in the classi-
fication task. Therefore, we split the negative samples in five
parts and we repeat our evaluation every time with a differ-
ent subset of negative samples. Then, to train and test our
model, we utilize a 10-fold cross validation preserving the
percentage of samples for each class.
We evaluate the classification (troll vs. user) results ob-
tained by using the two different IRL approaches to esti-
mate the rewards. As we previously mentioned, we test the
Maximum Entropy IRL (Ziebart et al. 2008) and the Max-
imum Entropy Deep IRL (Wulfmeier, Ondruska, and Pos-
ner 2015). We utilize the rewards inferred by each of these
approaches to feed a supervised learning classification al-
gorithm. In particular, we compare several off-the-shelf ma-
chine learning approaches. Performance, in terms of Area
Under the Curve (AUC), of the different classifiers and IRL
approaches are depicted in Table 1. In most of the cases,
the Maximum Entropy IRL approach achieves better accu-
racy with respect to the Maximum Entropy Deep IRL solu-
tion. Thus, we continue our analysis by leveraging the re-
Table 1: IRL approaches performance comparison: AUC of
different classifiers fed with the rewards computed with the
Maximum Entropy IRL (Ziebart et al. 2008) and the Maxi-
mum Entropy Deep IRL (Wulfmeier, Ondruska, and Posner
2015) approaches.
Max. Entropy Max. Entropy Deep
K-Neighbors 83.2% 82.4%
SVC 74.2% 85.4 %
Gaussian Process 83.8% 85.6%
Decision Tree 82.7% 74.1%
MLP 84.4% 79.8%
AdaBoost 89.1% 83.3%
Random Forest 86.7% 81.3%
Naive Bayes 79.3% 78.7%
Figure 3: Classification performance at varying k.
wards estimated with Maximum Entropy IRL. Also, we rely
on AdaBoost as it outperforms the other supervised learning
algorithms. We tune the AdaBoost classifier by performing
a grid search of its hyper-parameters, whose best configu-
ration involves 500 weak estimators and a learning rate of
0.05. The combination of Maximum Entropy IRL with Ad-
aBoost achieves an AUC of 89.1%. To further investigate
the classification performance of such a solution, we con-
sider the trade-off between sensitivity (i.e., the proportion
of correctly identified trolls) and specificity (i.e., the pro-
portion of correctly identified users) by measuring the True
Positive Rate (TPR) and the True Negative Rate (TNR), re-
spectively. Our approach achieves an average TPR of 79.5%
and an average TNR of 83.2%. These results suggest that the
proposed solution builds a conservative classification model
that is mainly targeted at the minimization of false positives
(i.e., users classified as trolls). This represents a favorable
asset of the proposed methodology, as the inaccurate clas-
sification of organic users might elicit both ethical concerns
and an overhead for social media providers engaged in purg-
ing their platforms from malicious entities.
We further evaluate the performance of our approach by
considering classification metrics such as accuracy, preci-
sion, recall (or TPR), F1 and AUC at varying k. As we men-
tioned in Section Data, we filtered out accounts that were
involved in less than k = 10 active and passive online ac-
tivities. Here, we aim to examine the impact of k on the
classification performance. In Figure 3, we display the clas-
sification performance of the proposed solution (Maximum
Figure 4: AdaBoost feature importance.
Entropy IRL with AdaBoost) in terms of the classification
metrics mentioned above. As we could expect performance
improves as k increases as the Maximum Entropy IRL ap-
proach can rely on more information per each user. It is also
noticeable that, when k = 10 (i.e, the scenario considered up
to this point), precision is higher than recall. This confirms
the conservative scheme of the IRL-based model towards the
minimization of false positives, as highlighted before in the
comparison between TPR and TNR. Interestingly, the gap
between precision and recall diminishes with increasing k
and their values nearly converge when k > 10. This finding
shows that the proposed model enhances its ability of iden-
tifying trolls when more information about accounts’ online
activity is available. Overall, our detection approach, even
with a small amount of information, achieves prominent per-
formance in every classification metric. This supports our in-
tuition of using IRL to analyze online behavior and to iden-
tify malicious troll accounts accordingly.
To investigate the most distinguishing characteristics be-
tween trolls’ and users’ behavior, we observe the feature im-
portance of the AdaBoost algorithm. In Fig. 4, the relative
importance of each feature (i.e., reward) is displayed. Inter-
estingly, the most important features are related to the case
when the account is in the state RT (i.e., its content have
been re-shared by other accounts) or RP (i.e., it is engaged
by other users). To shed light on the significance of such
cues, in the next subsection, we provide a statistical assess-
ment of the estimated rewards of troll and user accounts.
Rewards Analysis
To better understand the difference in trolls’ and users’ in-
tent, we compare their estimated rewards. Figure 5 displays
the distribution of the rewards assessed with Maximum En-
tropy IRL and highlights some differences in the behavior
of the two classes of accounts.2 This discrepancy is also
demonstrated by a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test,
which in turn unveils significant differences (p < 0.01) be-
2It should be noticed that the displayed rewards have been nor-
malized by using the StandardScaler technique (i.e., each features
is standardized by removing the mean and scaling to unit variance).
Figure 5: Distribution of the estimated rewards by Maximum Entropy IRL.
tween every pair of distributions, except for the state-action
pair (NT,nt), (NT,rt), and (RP,rt). By looking at Fig. 4, we
can notice how these three rewards are in the 5 least impor-
tant features for the AdaBoost classifier. From Fig. 5, it is
possible to notice a flat distribution for the pair (NT,nt). This
is due to the fact that we do not observe any instance of such
scenario in users’ trajectory, given that we can only leverage
data that show users’ involvement (either active or passive)
in the tweets.
Furthermore, in Fig. 5, it can be appreciated how, on aver-
age, trolls are more motivated (i.e., higher reward) to share
a new original tweet (action tw) with respect to users re-
gardless of their state, which suggest that trolls merely focus
on spreading their content, independently from others’ feed-
back. Also, the most noticeable discrepancy is appreciable
in the actions performed when the account is in the RT state,
which is in line with the feature importance results displayed
in Fig. 4.
The latter also showed that the RP state is relevant in the
discrimination between trolls and users. To take a closer look
at the features related to this state, in Fig. 6, we depict the
violin plot distribution of the estimated rewards related to
RP state. It can be observed how the distributions of troll
and user accounts particularly differ in the case of action nt
and rp, which are the first and forth most relevant features
of the AdaBoost classifier.
Moreover, being a linear model, the Maximum entropy
IRL approach allows to disentangle the reward of each state-
action pair. This is done by solving Eq. 1, given that f is
known and R has been estimated with Maximum entropy
IRL. This operation allows us to recover the weights θ that
represent a measure of importance for each feature in f .
The weights distribution for each class of accounts is dis-
played in Fig. 7. The violin plot distribution further high-
lights behavioral differences between trolls and users, which
are proved to be significant for every feature (p < 0.01)
by means of a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Addi-
tionally, Fig. 7 confirms the differences of behavior between
trolls and users when they are in state RT and RP, consis-
tently with our previous findings. Also, the action that shows
the most noticeable discrepancy between the two groups of
Figure 6: Violin plot of the estimated rewards in the RP state.
account is related to the active tweet (tw).
Finally, in Fig. 8, we depict the mean value of such dis-
tributions. The purpose is to compare the relevance of each
feature between troll and user accounts. On average, trolls
appear to be more motivated than users in generating new
content (tw) and re-sharing others’ post (rt). This finding is
in line with trolls’ purpose of spreading (false) pieces of in-
formation and harm the online conversation. On the other
hand, users appear to be more rewarded than trolls when
their content is re-shared by other accounts (RT). This, rep-
resenting a form of social endorsement (Metaxas et al. 2015;
Stella, Ferrara, and De Domenico 2018), might suggest that
users are more concerned about others’ esteem with respect
Figure 7: Distribution of weights θ for each feature in f .
Figure 8: Comparison of θ average values of trolls and users.
to trolls.
Related Work
Russian Trolls
Trolls, along with bots, are the principle actors in manipu-
lation and misinformation campaigns on social media. The
2016 US Presidential election raised awareness of such is-
sue and, in particular, spotlighted the activity of malicious
operators allegedly funded by the IRA.
Badawy et al. (Badawy et al. 2019) showed that Russian
trolls aimed to harm the political conversation and create
distrust in the political system. These users operated with
the objective of influencing conversations about political is-
sues and creating discord among different groups (Gerber
and Zavisca 2016; Popken 2018; Stewart, Arif, and Star-
bird 2018). In (Stewart, Arif, and Starbird 2018), it is shown
how trolls acted to accentuate disagreement and sow divi-
sion along divergent frames, as further confirmed by Dutt et
al. (Dutt, Deb, and Ferrara 2018) in relation to Russian ads
on Facebook. In (Badawy, Ferrara, and Lerman 2018), the
authors studied the effects of the manipulation campaign by
analyzing the accounts that endorsed trolls activity on Twit-
ter. They found that conservative leaning users re-shared
trolls content 30 times more than liberal ones. Zannettou et
al. (Zannettou et al. 2019a) compared trolls behavior with
other (random) Twitter accounts recognizing differences in
the content they spread, in the evolution of their accounts,
and in the strategy adopted to increase their impact.
Furthermore, the nefarious activity of Russian trolls has
not only been recognized in the political context. As an ex-
ample, in (Broniatowski et al. 2018), the authors study the
attempt of such operators to undermine the public health in
the vaccine debate. Trolls further evidenced their strategy
of promoting discord, in this scenario across pro- and anti-
vaccination arguments.
Malicious Accounts Detection
The detection of malicious accounts represents a piv-
otal asset in the fight against the abuse of social me-
dia. Bots and trolls are known to be used in coordi-
nated campaigns (Mønsted et al. 2017; Stella, Ferrara, and
De Domenico 2018; Zannettou et al. 2019b; Addawood et
al. 2019; Im et al. 2019; Kim et al. 2019), whose detection
is hard (Ferrara et al. 2016; Varol et al. 2017b). The research
community offered multiple approaches for identifying au-
tomated accounts (Davis et al. 2016; Varol et al. 2017a;
Yang et al. 2019; Chavoshi, Hamooni, and Mueen 2016;
Subrahmanian et al. 2016; Chen and Subramanian 2018;
Kudugunta and Ferrara 2018). Differently from bots, the
automated detection of trolls is still an open challenge.
Zannettou et al. (Zannettou et al. 2019b) investigate state-
sponsored trolls on Twitter and Reddit. In particular, the au-
thors focus on Russian and Iranian trolls trying to charac-
terize their activity and strategies. They found that the be-
havior of such trolls is not consistent over time, thus, their
automated identification is not a straightforward task.
Concurrently with our undertaking, two approaches for
unveiling the activity of Russian trolls on Twitter have been
proposed (Addawood et al. 2019; Im et al. 2019). To identify
trolls attempt to manipulate the public opinion during the
2016 US election, Addawood et al. (Addawood et al. 2019)
identified 49 linguistic markers of deception and measured
their use by troll accounts. They show that such deceptive
language cues can help to accurately identify trolls. In (Im
et al. 2019), the authors proposed a detection approach that
relies on users’ metadata, activity (e.g., number of shared
links, retweets, mentions, etc.), and linguistic features to
identify active trolls on Twitter.
Our work is similar to the above mentioned efforts in the
objective of unveiling troll accounts. However, differently
from (Addawood et al. 2019; Im et al. 2019), we do not aim
at spotting differences in trolls’ language or metadata. We
do not exploit such signals to identify trolls, but we focus
on uncovering hidden behavioral differences between troll
and non-troll accounts. As we do not leverage either social
network-dependent metadata or language features, our ap-
proach can potentially be generalized on different social me-
dia and to state-sponsored trolls originating from different
countries. In fact, our solution only relies on the sequence of
users’ activity on online platforms to capture the incentives
the two classes of accounts respond to.
A sequence analysis approach has also been proposed in
(Kim et al. 2019) for classifying the social roles of trolls.
The authors exploit the temporal and semantic similarity in
the sequence of shared content (i.e., tweet) to classify trolls
into the categories (e.g., left-leaning, right-leaning, news
feed) defined in (Boatwright, Linvill, and Warren 2018). We
share with this work (Kim et al. 2019) the idea of discern-
ing classes of accounts based on their activity traces. While
Kim et al. (Kim et al. 2019) consider text and time as fea-
tures to categorize the troll population into subgroups, our
undertaking estimates the motivation behind the sequence
of online activities to discern troll and non-troll accounts,
without considering content and temporal differences in the
tweet sequences.
Discussion
In this paper, we showed that Russian trolls, although not
relying on automated activity, do not act and behave as or-
ganic users. Their distinct behavior enabled their accurate
identification and a principled understanding of the incen-
tives behind their online activities. However, given the ratio-
nale of our detection approach, trolls might alter their reg-
ular activity and implement evasion strategies to avoid de-
tection. For instance, trolls might decide to mutate their be-
havior by operating similarly to other users. This, however,
could potentially affect trolls’ main purpose of harming on-
line discussion, which, in turn, may limit the effectiveness of
their malicious activity. Such discussion, and related adver-
sarial analysis, opens the door to diverse research directions,
which we plan to explore in future work.
Another limitation of the presented approach is related to
the size of the dataset used in our analysis, which, in turn,
pertains to a single political event (i.e., 2016 US Presiden-
tial election). We recognize that a larger and different set of
data would be needed to validate our approach across sets of
trolls with diverse origins and purposes. However, this rep-
resents a challenging objective for two reasons, at the mini-
mum. First, trolls associated with state-agencies are needed
as ground truth to verify the accuracy of our approach.
Therefore, the identity of such accounts (e.g., in terms of
username) should be disclosed by social media providers or
other entities (e.g., the US Congress in the case of the 2016
US Presidential election). Second, corresponding non-troll
accounts (same country, context, topics of discussion) are
needed as negative samples to learn a model and enable the
accounts classification. As an example, the set of data re-
cently released by Twitter (Gadde and Roth 2018) includes
only information about the activity of malicious users. How-
ever, the flow of online activities performed by organic users
and the interactions among every kind of account represent
the necessary ingredients to fuel our approach. These chal-
lenges represent fertile ground for future work aimed to pro-
vide an exhaustive validation of the presented solution.
Nevertheless, in this paper, we have presented a first at-
tempt to identify state-sponsored (Russian) trolls by uncov-
ering the incentives driving their behavior. The IRL-based
model provides a generalizable approach, which is agnos-
tic to the OSN platform and to the nature of the troll ac-
counts, which both represent a breakthrough with respect to
existing solutions for the detection of troll accounts. Also,
and not secondarily, our solution provides an explainable
model, which is in line with the emerging paradigm of
eXplainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) (Gunning 2017;
Pedreschi et al. 2019). Indeed, by leveraging IRL, our ap-
proach is capable of unveiling and discerning the most pe-
culiar behavioral characteristics (i.e., the features of the clas-
sification algorithm) between troll and user accounts that en-
able their accurate classification. Given that such a method-
ology is also agnostic to the specific phenomenon of online
trolling, IRL may represent a useful addition to the toolbox
of user behavior analysis. This asset, combined with the gen-
eralizable nature of the proposed solution, allows us to en-
vision this detection system to be used in various domains
(e.g., politics, health, etc.) and along different dimensions,
not only related to the manipulation of public opinion in the
political context, but also, and more generally, in the fight
against every form of online harassment and abuse in social
media (e.g., cyberbullying).
Conclusion
Social media manipulation is an issue of paramount impor-
tance, potentially harming the integrity of the online dis-
course and, in the political context, hampering the demo-
cratic process. Bots and trolls represent the most recog-
nized categories of malicious accounts acting in such efforts.
While the detection of bots has established solutions, the au-
tomated identification of troll accounts has been proven to be
a challenging (yet unsolved) task.
In this paper, we presented an approach to detect trolls’
activity on social media. The proposed solution is based on
Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) and only relies on
the flow of online activity. IRL allowed us to characterize
the behavior of social media actors by inferring the reward
structure (or motivational affordances) behind their actions.
These cues are further employed as inputs of a supervised
learning algorithm aimed at classifying troll and non-troll
accounts. Considering the set of trolls identified by the US
Congress as tied with the Russia’s IRA, we show that our ap-
proach accurately separates trolls from other users by lever-
aging and exploiting the diverse motivations between the
two classes of accounts. The IRL model also allowed us to
recognize and unveil the most distinctive behavior that dif-
ferentiate troll from non-troll accounts. For example, Rus-
sian trolls and users differ in their behavior when they are
engaged by other users or their content is re-shared. Also,
troll accounts appear to perform their sharing activity irre-
spective of others’ feedback and simply focus on the spread
of the content they generate.
This paper represents a first step in the direction of under-
standing, characterizing, and detecting trolls, which is a crit-
ical challenge in the race towards healthy online ecosystems.
In our future endeavors, we aim to validate the proposed ap-
proach with data from other known state-sponsored trolls.
Also, we aspire to extend the classification task to a diverse
set of malicious entities motivated by different incentives.
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